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A commentary on
How body balance influences political party evaluations: a Wii balance board study
by Dijkstra, K., Eerland, A., Zijlmans, J., and Post, L. S. (2012). Front. Psychology 3:536. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00536
Embodied cognition is the hypothesis that things other than the brain contribute meaningfully to
the structure of our cognition. A critical (and often ignored) corollary of this is that any example
of embodied cognition in action needs an account of exactly how these distributed elements are
connected to one another so that they might affect each other. A given embodied cognition effect
therefore needs to come with a plausible path along which information can flow (Wilson and
Golonka, 2013). Identifying this path is difficult, and it’s not always possible to do so immediately;
this is not a problem, and simply indicates a place for future research. However, when the only viable
pathway is tested and fails, there is a problem and it suggests that there is something fundamentally
wrong with the analysis of the task.
Dijkstra et al. (2012) asked people to attribute neutral political statements to Dutch political
parties spanning the left/right political spectrum. Participants’ posture was surreptitiously altered
to be slightly (2%) left or right of center. The hypothesis was that leaning to the left/right would
prime the conceptual metaphor “left wing/right wing.” This would thenmake the primedmetaphor
more likely to be used to interpret the otherwise neutral political statements, making people more
likely to attribute the statement to a party they know to be left/right wing. This hypothesis would
be supported if leaning left/right made people more likely to select a party they believed was left
wing/right wing.
When leaning left, people were indeed more likely to attribute the statements to left-wing
political parties (p < 0.01), but when leaning right there was only a trend to attribute the statements
to right wing parties (p = 0.07). The authors concluded that the results support the hypothesis.
There is a problem, however. The effect was only apparent when the political party’s affiliations
were coded according to their actual affiliation (Dijkstra et al., Figure 2). The effect vanishes entirely
when the party affiliations were coded according to participants’ knowledge of that affiliation. This
is because the participants were only able to correctly identify the affiliation of fewer than half of the
10 parties, and, in general, scored very low on measures of interest and knowledge of politics. The
participants were missing a critical part of the puzzle (knowing which parties were left or right
wing)—so how were they able to connect the conceptual dots to generate the observed effect?
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The authors suggest that the problem was that the 2D
grid task which measured knowledge (left wing/right wing
by progressive/conservative) was too hard (see also Dijkstra
et al., 2014). As evidence they show a small but significant
improvement in affiliation identification in a second group
of participants using a 1D left/right classification (5.97/10, vs.
4.57/10 for the first group). However, the first group never
completed the easier classification task and the second group
never matched statements to parties. There is also the fact that
the first group showed very low interest and knowledge in politics
in general, suggesting they may not have benefited from the
different task. At the very least, the onus is on the authors to
replicate their effect with the alternative measure of knowledge,
and show that the key interaction now shows up when the
data are coded according to the results of that measure. We are
currently left to infer that this would happen.
Dijkstra et al., did the right thing in measuring the critical link
(knowledge of political affiliation) but they have failed to identify
that the overall pattern of results as they stand do not and cannot
support their conceptual embodiment hypothesis. Their results
show there is no plausible mechanism to explain the effect, no
path along which information could flow. Whatever happened, it
was not caused by a metaphor being grounded in postural sway.
Analysis
We think a problem with this line of research lies in the absence
of a detailed task analysis (Wilson and Golonka, 2013). What,
precisely, is the task facing the observer, and what are the critical
resources available to solve the task at hand? These questions are
never addressed in this or any related embodiment research. For
example, why is posture implicated in the task at all? The left
wing/right wing convention comes from the spatial organization
of the French legislature.Whywould this be grounded in postural
sway? And why would a small change in posture (on the order of
a perfectly ordinary, moment-to-moment postural adjustment)
affect political attribution? There may be a story, but it is not yet
forthcoming.
Contrast this to some of the most successful embodied
cognition programmes around. The embodied solutions to things
such as the A-not-B error (Thelen et al., 2001) and the outfielder
problem (McBeath et al., 1995) are grounded in a meticulous
analysis of what is absolutely required to solve a given task, as well
as an account of how these resources are assembled to implement
that solution. The net result is a model which accounts for large
amounts of pre-existing data and which makes testable (and
successful) predictions of large, robust effects. You cannot make
the A-not-B error without reaching like an infant, and so reaching
is a critical part of the overall explanation. You can, however,
attribute neutral political statements to parties without leaning
in any direction. Posture is therefore not a task-critical element
and there is, as yet, no adequate account in the literature as to
why our conceptualization of the political world should reflect it.
Embodied cognition is the hypothesis that the form of
our behavior emerges from a distributed set of task resources
working together to solve a task. Embodied cognition researchers
therefore have an obligation to identify both the composition and
the organization of this distributed system, in order to account
for how there might possibly be more to us than our brains.
Without this ground work, our explanations for our data are
massively under-constrained and we might fail to notice that the
dots could not possibly have been connected the way we claimed.
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